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of 1961, the second issue immediately arose. This related to the Coast Province as a whole -a much larger administrative unit, which included the 'Ten-Mile Strip' but stretched far inland.
From 1962 to 1964 the politics of Kenya's independence were dominated by the argument over whether each of Kenya's provinces should become 'regions' at independence, with substantial devolved power, or whether they should continue to be no more than administrative units of a centralized state. These debates ended with a clear victory for the proponents of a single, centralized state. The Ten-Mile Strip did not become independent; and after a brief experiment with regional government, Kenya moved to a centralized administrative structure at the end of 1964.
In recalling this history, those who claim to represent the MRC change or blur the details of these events, and draw them into arguments about legitimate authority and the primacy of different communities at the coast. In studying the way that people discuss these events, this article speaks to two wider academic debates. One is about the power of historical representation -power over such representation, and the power created by it. While some of these retellings of history evidence a familiar theme -the malleability of remembered historical knowledge and the flexibility of oral history -the centrality of written treaties suggests a rather different phenomenon. By citing such documents, the MRC offers a challenge to the esoteric knowledge which lies behind state authority, the distribution of which is profoundly inequitable, and it asserts a claim to an alternative authoritative knowledge of documents which can remake power -a subversive appropriation of what Sharon Hutchinson, in another context, has called the 'hidden powers of "paper"'. 6 Levels of literacy on the Kenya coast are much higher than those in Hutchinson's study area in southern Sudan, but here too words on paper are attributed a special, sometimes magical, power which may be particularly compelling for those who cannot read them. 7 Even for those who can read English, the texts of these treaties are not easily available, and they are couched in an obscure and exclusive style.
Reinterpreting their content, as the MRC does, turns esoteric power on its head in a way which offers an alternative 'world on paper', and has a powerful allure for those who feel that documents embody what Hutchinson called a 'simultaneous dependence on and estrangement from the powers of the government'. 8 The other debate is about contending visions of legitimacy, and sets a legal sovereignty rooted in the alleged details of treaties against rights claimed on the basis of autochthony. The uneasy relationship between these two kinds of claim is evident elsewhere in Kenya, and across the continent more
widely, where what Gabrielle Lynch has called the 'common search for prosperity and security of tenure amidst underdevelopment and state failure' has encouraged a language of indigeneity -which is not entirely novel, but has gained new strength in recent years. 9 Lotte Hughes has shown how recent Maasai claims to land, and to political autonomy, combine references to colonial treaties with the assertion of indigenous status 10 . But legal sovereignty and the claims of autochthony may instead be in tension. They invoke different notions of legitimacy -the Casamance separatists of Senegal justify their agenda through reference to colonial treaties to 'mask the primordial object of the claim', as Mamadou Diouf has put it, and avoid accusations of tribalism. 11 But on Kenya's coast, sovereignty and autochthony also define different, potentially rivalrous, constituencies: the MRC has many voices, which speak in different ways through different media, and their differences reveal disharmony, as well as a shared sense of oppression. For some of these voices, the MRC is a movement founded based on treaties and the sovereignty which these construct, and it is ethnically and racially inclusive. For others, it is a movement based on autochthony, and on the exclusive claims of particular ethnic groups.
Land and race and tottered into bankruptcy, the Sultan was bullied and bribed to buy out the 'rights' it had been granted through the 1895 treaty, under which the British government took over the Company's powers to administer and tax in return for an annual payment to the Sultan of £17,000: £11,000 in rent, and £6,000 as interest on the £200,000 which (according to a rather complicated logic) the Sultan had paid to the Company to surrender the lease, and was therefore deemed to have lent to the British government.
12
The agreements of 1890 and 1895 thus embodied two claims to legal sovereignty. They were the formal basis of British control over the Kenya coast -a crucial legitimating device in a time of competitive European expansion. But even more fundamentally they both asserted and limited the sovereignty of the Omani sultans of Zanzibar, on the basis of a political authority that was exiguous outside the few major urban settlements which fringed the Indian Ocean. Rooted in many hundreds of years of settlement from and commerce with the Gulf, the Omani presence more immediate origins in the nineteenth-century, when the Oman's ruling family became both beneficiary and victim of British patronage. 13 British protection allowed one branch of the family, in Zanzibar, to split away from Oman after the death of the long-ruling Seyyid Said in 1856; and British capital, as well as diplomatic and military support, allowed the newly-styled sultans of Zanzibar to maintain and extend their influence along the East African coast. 14 The treaties turned this uncertain authority into an internationally-recognized sovereignty -but also limited it to a strip ten miles wide. 18 Those who owned the land could not use it; those who used it could not own it -and the distinction between them was based on racial and ethnic categorizations. 19 The situation became steadily more complex over time. British officials claimed that increasing numbers of people who had lived just inland from the Ten-Mile Strip were moving on to vacant land along the coast, either to escape from food shortages or to take advantage of cash markets for produce -or both. Those described by the British as migrants largely belonged to the groups who were called Nyika at the time, and are now more often called Mijikenda: Giriama, Digo and others, who were considered both coastal and African. 20 These squatters themselves insisted that they were simply occupying lands which had always been theirs. By the later 1940s and 1950s, an explicitly racial language of antagonism between landowner and squatter was commonplace along the coast. 21 The squatters were persistently on the losing side in legal terms and there were frequent evictions; but many landowners could not survive without squatter labour, and the state lacked the resources to prevent the widespread petty challenges to landowners' property rights, which ranged from cutting firewood or harvesting fruit, to grazing livestock on their land or growing and harvesting annual crops. 22 Until the 1950s, the language of these challenges was little recorded; in such written accounts as exist, there is no mention of the 1895 agreement, though evidently Arabs were very conscious of the significance of the treaty, and the symbolic power of the sultan's flag. 23 But in the early 1950s, some
Arabs and Asians on the coast, inspired by political developments in Zanzibar and uneasy over the prospect of political change in Kenya, had begun to argue that that the distinct legal position of the Ten-Mile Strip could be used to fend off 'African' rule in favour of some form of autonomy. 24 Over the next few years they used the term mwambao -a name for the coast itself -as an abbreviated statement of their ambitions. The adoption of this slogan conveniently glossed over a persistent uncertainty as to whether the aim was complete independence or some more limited autonomy.
Enthusiasm for mwambao was characterized, as Brennan has said, by 'opportunism ... and socioeconomic incoherence' and multiple political parties emerged to campaign for slightly varying visions of this goal; the most visible of these was the Coast People's Party (CPP). 25 Divided though they were, all these parties shared the sense that the 1895 treaty was the basis of their campaign.
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This inspired a reactive opposition to the treaty from those who considered themselves 'African' leaders, and who insisted on preeminent claims of auotchthony. Following the decision by the colonial government to allow district-level political organizations in 1955, several parties were created at the coast which -as was characteristic of the period-were explicitly racial in the way they defined their constituencies: : the Mombasa African District Union (MADU); the Kilifi African Peoples Union (KAPU) and, briefly, the Kwale African Democratic Union. 27 All were directly concerned with the land issue:
There was no foreign nation which came to Africa with cargoes of soil from their homes, so there is no foreign soil here on the East African coast. This is black land, and the indigenous people are black, from the outset, and it must remain in black hands until the end of the world. These organizations were led by educated men who were enthusiastic letter-writers and producers of pamphlets, as well as public-speakers: race, autochthony, political primacy and claims to land were all bound up in their language, and they mocked the illogicality of treaty-based claims:
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It is amazing to claim that one land can be ruled by two monarchs . . . we know we are ruled by just one monarch, and she is British, and it is she who will lead us Africans on the road to self-government 30 The leaders of KAPU and MADU saw mwambao as a device to perpetuate Arab dominance; in 1960, hearing that the Sultan was visiting London, they wrote urgently to the Secretary of State insisting that he should not make any new agreement concerning the coast without consulting the African populace, who were its rightful owners. 31 There were multiple ethnic tensions -notably relating to competition for urban employment -within the African population of the coast, notably between the Mijikenda (a term which was just coming into widespread use) and more recent arrivals from 'upcountry'. 32 But all shared a suspicion of mwambao.
The Robertson Commission
When, in 1961, the British government decided that the issue of the Ten-Mile Strip could best be formally settled by appointing a 'Commissioner' to inquire into the matter, the outcome of that inquiry was already decided. The expectation was that the Commissioner, James Robertson, would recommend that the coast should be part of an independent Kenya. 33 But the opponents of mwambao did not know this, and what followed was a remarkable moment of political mobilization and popular activism.
By this time, Ronald Ngala had emerged as the main African political leader at the coast, and as a key figure in the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU When members of the delegation visited the Kenya Governor on return from Zanzibar, they reportedly told him that they were 'totally opposed to the idea of an autonomous state'. 46 There is no evidence that the delegation's visit had any effect on the attitude of the Sultan -who had by this time made it clear that he had no intention of supporting the secessionists. 47 Nor, presumably, was it of much concern to Robertson, who had already been told privately by the Governor that 'most thinking people in Nairobi and in the Government felt that autonomy for the Coast was a non-starter'. 48 But it did assert a specifically Mijikenda claim to political primacy.
In December 1961 Robertson duly recommended that the Ten-Mile Strip should become part of Kenya at independence. 49 The formal conclusion of the process was delayed for almost two years, however. In October 1963, shortly before independence, the Sultan renounced his claims to sovereignty over the coast in a treaty between Britain and the Sultan, and an immediately consequent exchange of letters between the prime ministers of Kenya and Zanzibar set out guarantees over Muslim education, worship and the jurisdiction of Muslim family law courts, as well as existing property rights, on the coast. 50 The delay between Robertson's report and the treaty was not a result of difficult negotiations with the Sultan -who had made clear his acceptance of Robertson's recommendations in March 1962. 51 It was rather that the issue of the Sultan's sovereignty had become entirely overshadowed by another debate, which had swiftly changed patterns of racial and ethnic alliance in ways which were to have long-term significance. This was the debate over regionalism, or majimbo.
Mwambao to Majimbo
In October 1961 -even as Robertson was collecting evidence -KADU had been developing a new and distinctive policy, calling for Kenya to become independent with a constitution which would turn its former, centralized system of provinces into 'regions' with significant devolved powers. There is continued debate over the extent to which this policy may have been encouraged by white settlers, who saw it as a possible way to entrench their privileged position; whatever the origin of the policy, regionalism was seized upon by Ngala and other KADU leaders as a policy which answered their anxieties over domination by Kikuyu and Luo -the two ethnic groups which mainly supported KANU. 52 In some of the submissions to Robertson, the idea of regionalism was making its first, uncertain appearance, and some struggled to distinguish this idea from that of secession: pressed in one meeting over apparent inconsistency, one advocate of regionalism had to admit that 'they had not worked out details as yet'. 53 By the end of 1961, the brief alliance which had allowed KANU and KADU supporters on the coast to cooperate in rejecting mwambao had been forgotten; for the next three years, regionalism was the key issue, and in this case the debate concerned the Coast Province as a whole, rather than the preceded by campaigns of whispering and threatening leaflets aimed at 'up-country' people. 66 The generalized sense of coastal grievance overlapped uncertainly with a sense of exclusion which was specific to Muslims -the 'Islamic Party of Kenya', which flourished briefly in the 1990s, while cast as a movement of 'Islamic extremism', was a largely coastal movement which picked up on the wider themes of economic and educational marginalization, and the alleged extraction of wealth by upcountry people. 67 A succession of minor, legal, parties drew on this feeling, though none were bold enough to publicly advocate secession. 68 Alongside these circulating documents, and taking up and amplifying their themes, people continued to elaborate through speech -sometimes to crowds, sometimes in everyday conversation -their claims to an alternative knowledge of the treaties of the 1890s and 1960s. Confusion over the content of these documents has multiplied: the only extended study of the MRC, while in many ways a reflective and thoughtful piece of work, reproduces multiple factual inaccuracies. 80 One common assertion is that the agreements enshrined coastal autonomy, since the treaty uniting the coast with … we have a treaty with Kenya, if all that we agreed is not fulfilled then there is justice for a broken treaty, we agreed with Kenya that the administration from the highest rank to the bottom should be our fellow coast people. avoiding any direct endorsement of its secessionist agenda. 88 Meanwhile the self-proclaimed leaders of the MRC themselves continue to generate uncertainty over the precise nature of their agenda, distancing themselves from leaflets threatening violence against 'up-country' people, and announcing that the movement is peaceful and a 'social' one -but also insisting on independence, and in some cases threatening to enforce an electoral boycott by violence. 89 Behind these uncertainties looms a larger one, for the old division within 'coastal' opinion is still apparent -though some argue that the MRC has united coastal people. 90 Those who say they speak 
